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1. From Naturphilosophie to Identitätssystem 
In May 1801, as Schelling later reported in a letter to Eschenmayer, “the light burst 
upon me in philosophy” (1962 3:222), an illumination that gave rise to the 
programmatic Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie and the various attempts 
at formulating the Identitätssystem that were to follow. It was an illumination, 
moreover, that occurred only four months after Schelling had published the 
culminating statement of his early Naturphilosophie, Über den wahren Begriff der 
Naturphilosophie. Between January and May 1801 – between issues one and two of 
the second volume of the Zeitschrift für speculative Physik – Schelling’s 
philosophical vision apparently underwent a revelation, made visible as the transition 
from Naturphilosophie to Identitätssystem. 
 Nevertheless, it is a foolish gesture to neatly differentiate a period of pure 
naturphilosophische research running from 1797 to January 1801 from a period of 
systematic construction grounded in the concept of identity that began in May 1801 
and continued to at least 1805.
1
 For one thing, as Grant (2006 3-6) has rightly insisted, 
Schelling never abandons his naturphilosophische research: some of his most 
important publications in this area occur after 1801, and there are few works written 
between 1801 and 1805 that do not substantially engage in Naturphilosophie.
2
 
Moreover, it is fairly easy to discern continuities between the concerns, concepts and 
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occasionally discursive strategies of the naturphilosophische texts of the late 1790s 
and those of the Identitätssystem. Thus, Beiser (2002 557), to take one example, reads 
the Identitätssystem as merely a further working out of the positions articulated in the 
Allgemeine Deduktion and Über den wahren Begriff, thereby contributing to the 
increasingly-popular case for a fundamental continuity to Schelling’s output as a 
whole.
3
 
 And yet, between January and May 1801 something does change. While this 
change may not often be substantial, there is at the very least an alteration in 
Schelling’s method and vocabulary. To put it bluntly, the Identitätssystem talks, for 
the most part, in the kind of classic metaphysical language that was purposefully 
avoided in the Naturphilosophie From May 1801 onwards, Schelling reverts to 
traditional metaphysical terminology, inquiring into the relation of form and essence, 
the nature of time, causality and knowledge, the origins of error and illusion. 
Solutions to the above were indeed implicit in the Naturphilosophie, but framed in 
terms of more esoteric issues usually eschewed by post-Kantian philosophy (the 
relation between light and gravity or magnetism and combustion). The 
Identitätssystem therefore returns to more conventional philosophical terrain and 
speaks in a more recognisable philosophical voice. It is for these sorts of reasons that 
Lukács (1980) notoriously identifies the beginnings of nineteenth-century restoration 
philosophy in Schelling’s development after 1800. 
 What follows is a case study in mapping this shift from Naturphilosophie to 
Identitätssystem. I trace Schelling’s discussions of individuation from 1799 to 1806 
not just as a means of understanding the nature of the above transition, but crucially as 
a way of evaluating what was lost and what gained by it. Lukács may be the most 
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explicit, but he is certainly not alone in considering the Identitätssystem an aberration, 
failed experiment or plain mistake. It has been the least sympathetically treated of any 
phase of Schelling’s career: its austere monism and endlessly proliferating 
constructions of potencies have put off many a commentator.
4
 The question then 
needs to be asked: why did Schelling feel compelled to erect this seemingly 
reactionary monstrosity? What did he hope to gain from the transition from a radical 
Naturphilosophie to the traditional metaphysical concerns of the Identitätssystem? My 
intention is to use the case study of individuation to provide some answers to these 
questions, thereby illuminating the value of that “light that burst upon” Schelling in 
1801. Moreover, in so doing – and this is the third objective of the paper – the radical 
difference between Schelling and the mainstream of German philosophy from Jacobi 
to Hegel will also become clearer. The theme of individuation provides a salubrious 
exercise in exposing “the differend” (Toscano 2004 124) separating Schelling from 
the orthodoxies of German Idealism. 
 
 
2. Individuation in the Erster Entwurf 
To state that the 1799 Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie incessantly 
struggles with the problem of individuation is no exaggeration. Not only is 
individuation identified therein both as “the highest problem of the philosophy of 
nature” (1856 3:102; 2004 77) and its “chief problem” (18; 17), the text continually 
fails to offer satisfactory answers, such that Schelling ends up concluding, nature “is 
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not really concerned with the individual – it is rather occupied with the annihilation of 
the individual.” (50; 40)5 
 Naturphilosophie in the Erster Entwurf is characterised as a science of 
becoming, a reconstruction of the stages in the infinite, incessant movement of 
productivity or nature. This unconditional force of productivity – nature as properly 
conceived – underlies being without itself ever fully coming to be or be perceived in 
the phenomenal realm. Hence, the first principle of Naturphilosophie begins, “The 
unconditioned cannot be sought in any individual ‘thing’ nor in anything of which one 
can say that it ‘is’ For what ‘is’ only partakes of being, and is only an individual form 
or kind of being.” (11; 13) The problem of individuation that haunts the Erster 
Entwurf emerges as a direct result of this principle. That is, it generates two theses 
which must both be equally affirmed: 
 
1. Finite individuals in nature must be expressions of the productive force 
(hence, “products” of it), since there is nothing else that can produce them. 
 
2. Finite individuals in nature must fail to express this productive force, since 
the force itself – as unconditional and infinite – can never manifest itself 
entirely in a conditioned individual. 
 
The problem of affirming both (1) and (2) simultaneously is, in Schelling’s own 
words, this: productivity “does not exhibit itself entirely in any finite product, and 
[yet] every individual is, as it were, a particular expression of it.” (11; 13) 
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 Schelling here struggles with a synecdochical metaphysics: productivity both 
is its products and is more than them; nature both is and is not the entities of the 
natural world.
6
 It is little wonder, then, that it is here Nassar (2011) identifies the 
moment when Schelling stands closest to the Jena Romantics: the metaphysics of the 
Erster Entwurf perform the figures of irony and allegory, as finite natural products 
express the unconditioned in their very failure to express it. Schelling himself 
articulates this in terms of limitation and retardation: “If being itself is only activity, 
then the individual being can only be viewed as a determinate form or limitation of 
the originary activity.” (1856 3:12; 2004 14) In other words, the problem is how to 
slow productivity down so that it remains temporarily stationary, as static product 
rather than dynamic force. And this is merely to restate the above problem: products – 
when conceived from the viewpoint of “the unconditioned in nature” – are never 
entirely products, but merely temporary, partial retardations of the unconditioned that 
can never be permanent or complete on pain of negating the very productivity of the 
unconditioned. Schelling writes, 
 
If being itself is = to activity, then the individual being cannot be an absolute 
negation of activity… However, viewed from a higher standpoint, this being 
itself is nothing other than a continually operative natural activity that is 
extinguished in its product. (13; 14) 
 
However, of course, nature is never to be extinguished. In short, the unconditioned 
can never become conditioned without annulling its unconditioned nature (and since 
productivity is all there is, it cannot be so annulled).
7
 Thus Schelling writes, “Every 
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activity perishes in its product… [Hence] we do not know nature as product.” (13; 
14) From a naturphilosopische perspective, individual natural products cannot be 
fully accounted for; they cannot be known. Indeed, for the Naturphilosoph, 
“Originally, no individual being at all is present for us in Nature” (13; 14), or again, 
 
Nature exists nowhere as product; all individual productions in Nature are 
merely apparent products, not the absolute product that always becomes and 
never is, and in which the absolute activity exhausts itself. (16; 16) 
 
 Noteworthy in the above is how the problem of individuation begins to be 
recast as a problem of conceiving “the absolute product”. Hence, the second principle 
of Naturphilosophie states, “Absolute activity cannot be exhibited by a finite product, 
but only by an infinite one.” (14; 15) In order to make sense of them from the 
perspective of the unconditioned, products must express the unconditioned entirely: 
individuals must themselves become infinite or absolute. The problem of 
individuation therefore becomes one of accounting for that which is simultaneously 
conditioned and unconditioned – that which affirms, rather than negates, 
unconditional productivity within the bounds of limitation. This sets a new agenda 
that will come to dominate Schelling’s thinking on individuation over the coming 
decade: the “possibility of the exhibition of the infinite in the finite” (14; 15). If 
Naturphilosophie necessarily fails to make sense of individuality as a retardation or 
negation of the unconditioned, can it nonetheless comprehend the individual on the 
model of affirmation? It is, I will contend, precisely this question that Schelling 
answers affirmatively within the Identitätssystem.  
However, before considering in more detail Schelling’s alternative model of 
affirmation developed from 1801 onwards, I want to first place the Erster Entwurf’s 
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failure to account for individual natural products in the context of German Idealism as 
a whole. As we shall see, Schelling’s failure here is an implicit repetition of a 
Jacobian orthodoxy on individuation that dominated German philosophy at the turn of 
the nineteenth century – and, to that extent, in 1799 Schelling still remains trapped 
within a conventional form of German Idealist metaphysics. Only when he explicitly 
confronts it in the Identitätssystem, does Schelling finally liberate his philosophy from 
this speculative dead-end. 
 
 
3. The Jacobian Orthodoxy 
Jacobi’s basic argument in the Über die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen is as simple as it 
was effective: Spinoza’s philosophy stands as the model for speculative thought; 
within the limits of philosophy, no criticism can be levelled against it: “Within its 
boundaries, i.e. within the concept of nature, [Spinozism] is invincible” (1994 587). 
Nevertheless, Jacobi continues, the consequences of this system are devastating for all 
human religion, morality and well-being, for the Ethics ends in atheism and fatalism. 
That is, “when properly understood, Spinoza’s doctrines do not admit any kind of 
religion… [Hence] Spinozism is atheism”, and “every avenue of demonstration [as 
epitomised in Spinozism] ends up in fatalism.” (233-4) Thus, philosophical reason – 
whenever it is employed consistently – must necessarily result in the atheism and 
fatalism Spinozism exemplifies. Philosophical reason leads to the denial of God and 
freedom. The only alternative, Jacobi claims, the only means of saving religion and 
morality, is to give up on philosophy and turn instead to faith. He concludes “that the 
actual existence of a temporal world made up of individual, finite things… can in no 
way be conceptualised” (373); it is, instead, to be believed in through pre-cognitive 
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faith, “a certainty that lacks sufficient reason” (214) or “non-knowledge” (501). The 
closing words of the Briefe read, “The way to knowledge is therefore a mysterious 
one – not the way of syllogism – and much less the way of mechanism.” (249)8 
 Justifications for the above overarching polemic abound in the Briefe; for our 
purposes, the relevant critique concerns the problem of individuation. Jacobi denies 
that philosophy can provide intrinsic grounds for individuals; in consequence, an 
absolute individual (and so an absolute person or God) is rendered impossible from a 
philosophical perspective. As di Giovanni puts it, “The whole point of bringing up the 
issue of Lessing’s Spinozism was to argue that neither Spinozism, nor, for that matter, 
any metaphysical system was in a position to express the possibility of true 
individuation and hence true personality.” (1994 72) Or, as Jacobi himself succinctly 
puts it, “We are not able to have an idea of a being consisting in itself (that is, an 
individual).” (Jacobi 1994 242) So, on this count as on many others, philosophy 
seemingly ends in atheism. 
 The question of individuation in Spinoza’s philosophy itself is a perplexing 
one that lies beyond the scope of this paper. Spinoza is a substance-monist, and 
therefore prohibited from drawing substantial distinctions between individual entities; 
for this reason the problem is particularly pressing. While from a contemporary 
perspective its solution most probably revolves around the lemmas of Part II of the 
Ethics and the physics of complexity Spinoza develops there
9
, this does not seem to 
have been the case for readers of Spinoza in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. They – and this list includes not only Jacobi, but Herder, Schelling and 
Hegel too – remained uninterested in Spinoza’s physics in this context, and instead 
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sought a purely metaphysical solution to the problem of individuation. More 
specifically, there emerged out of Jacobi’s Briefe a tradition of metaphysically 
accounting for Spinozan individuation by means of the principle, omnis determinatio 
est negatio, which Spinoza employs in a 1674 letter to Jelles (Letter 50).  
 Spinoza’s Letter 50 consists for the most part in a discussion of the 
impropriety of calling God “one or single” (1995 259). This is because one can 
attribute number to an entity only if it belongs to a set which could potentially include 
other members. Spinoza writes, “We do not conceive things under the category of 
numbers unless they are included in a common class.” (259) However, God does not 
meet this condition; it cannot therefore be ascribed the property of being one: “He 
who calls God one or single has no true idea of God, or is speaking of him very 
improperly.” (260) This is, of course, implicitly relevant to the idea that God cannot 
be philosophically conceived as an individual, but in the next paragraph of the letter 
Spinoza goes on to make this explicit. Here, he reaffirms a statement obviously 
questioned by Jelles, “Figure is a negation and not anything positive.” (260) In other 
words, form is produced through an operation of negation, not affirmation. Spinoza 
continues, “apprehend[ing] a determinate thing” has nothing to do with the positive 
characteristics or qualities of that thing, rather it pertains to its “non-being” (260). He 
then concludes with the key principle, “Figure is nothing but determination, and 
determination is negation.” (260) Moreover, Spinoza explicitly applies this rule to 
what is infinite (in this case, the infinite mediate mode of extension): “It is obvious 
that matter in its totality, considered without limitation, can have no figure.” (260) 
Insofar as it is unbounded, what is infinite cannot be considered an individual. 
 Omnis determinatio est negatio forms the core of Jacobi’s demonstration of 
the impossibility of philosophically accounting for an absolute individual. He writes, 
 10 
“As far as the one infinite Substance of Spinoza is concerned, it has no determinate or 
complete existence on its own outside the individual things”, continuing in a note, 
“An absolute individual is just as impossible as an individual Absolute. Determinatio 
est negatio.” (1994 190) As a result, Letter 50 is promoted from a peripheral text to a 
major document of Spinozism, one revelatory of the structure of philosophy in 
general. What determines individuals for Spinoza and thus for all consistent 
philosophers is not an intrinsic property of an entity, but what it is not, its “non-being” 
as Spinoza put it. Specifically, an individual is determined by its difference from other 
individuals: “All things mutually presuppose one another and refer to one another, so 
that none of them can either be or be thought of without the rest, or the rest without 
it.” (227) Jacobi continues later in the Briefe, “Each and every living being 
presupposes all other individual things, and its nature and composition is thoroughly 
determined through its connection with all the rest.” (369)10 The philosopher’s 
universe, according to Jacobi, is a system of negations: what is determinate cannot be 
defined positively as it is in itself, but only negatively in terms of the fact it is not 
anything else. Philosophical reason is therefore incapable of grasping the intrinsic 
ground of an individual. It can theorise relations, but never persons: 
 
The possibility of the existence of all things known to us is supported by, and 
refers to, the coexistence of other individual things. We are not in a position 
to form the representation of a being that subsists completely on its own. 
(341) 
 
This is most problematic when it comes to God: absolute or unique individuals 
become inconceivable on this view. If individuals are constituted by being 
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differentiated from and so determined by other individuals, then they are necessarily 
finite.
11
 God, then, cannot be an individual, nor a person: “Insofar as God is infinite, 
therefore, there cannot be in him the concept of any actually, present, individual, 
thoroughly determinate thing” (226). In other words, a philosophical account of 
absolute personality absolved from any limiting relations with others is impossible, 
according to Jacobi – and this reveals the atheism of Spinozism and all philosophy. 
 
* * 
 
Jacobi’s characterisation of metaphysical accounts of individuation quickly became 
normative within German philosophy. He inaugurates a tradition that places Spinoza’s 
Letter 50 and the claim therein that omnis determinatio est negatio at the heart of 
philosophy’s self-understanding. For example, Herder accepts Jacobi’s contention that 
God cannot be philosophically conceived as an individual; he merely contests the 
criticisms that Jacobi draws directly from it. To refuse to think God as an individual is 
a philosophical virtue, according to Herder, for it would be presumptuous to try to 
characterise God at all: “The notion of limited personality is applied… 
inappropriately to that infinite being, for in our world ‘person’ is constituted only 
through limitation, as a kind of modus.” (1993 123) Fichte also stands close to this 
tradition in his insistence on the necessity of antithesis in the process of 
determination: “Nothing is known regarding what something is without the thought of 
what it is not.”12 To be something determinate it is necessary not to be other things: 
omnis determinatio est negatio. 
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 It is Hegel, however, who is Jacobi’s greatest disciple in this respect. Long 
after Schelling’s response to Jacobi in the Identitätssystem, it is Hegel who time and 
time again promulgates the Jacobian orthodoxy that philosophical accounts of 
individuation are premised on the principle, omnis determinatio est negatio. In the 
Logik, for example, Hegel describes this principle as a “dictum [of] infinite 
importance” (1958 4:127) and in the Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der 
Philosophie, he twice calls it a “great dictum” (17:310; 18:374). Hegel also follows 
Jacobi in promoting Letter 50 to a central document of Spinozism: omnis determinatio 
est negatio thereby becomes “the absolute principle of Spinozist philosophy.” (4:672) 
 Moreover, in an act of even greater fidelity to Jacobi, Hegel not only claims 
that this principle is the centrepiece of all philosophical accounts of individuation, but 
also he further claims that this principle (at least as it has previously been understood) 
cannot genuinely account for individuality, and certainly not for absolute 
individuality. That is, while Hegel vehemently attacks the “thoughtless” view that 
determination could be affirmative (8:218), he is equally insistent that omnis 
determinatio est negatio is problematic in accounting for individuals (even if he 
ultimately subscribes to this principle). On this principle, all individuals become 
abstract negations of a prior totality (Spinozan substance): this is not a two-way street 
where totality and individuals mutually constitute one another, but a one-way 
derivation of individuals from totality (4:127-8; 18:374-6). Such individuals, Hegel 
asserts, can only ever be epiphenomena in an acosmist worldview equivalent to 
atheism (8:148). Like Jacobi, Hegel links these problems to the fact that “substance 
lacks the principle of personality” in Spinoza’s philosophy. (4:672-3)13 
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 Of course, the above is only true, Hegel contends, insofar as the principle is 
inadequately understood (i.e. understood reflectively); on the other hand, the principle 
can properly account for individuation once understood as a speculative proposition – 
as Hegel himself is the first to do.
14
 Only when negation is not comprehended as a 
“formless abstraction” (4:127), only when it is understood not as Spinoza understood 
it but as Hegel does, does the principle omnis determinatio est negatio in fact form the 
basis of a successful philosophical account of individuation (4:672-3). Furthermore, 
so understood in this sublated form, it in fact becomes the only principle that can 
refute Jacobi’s critique of philosophical individuation. However, notwithstanding 
these differences from Jacobi, even here Hegel still places the operation of negation at 
the heart of a theory of individuation, and to that extent does still buy into a form of 
the Jacobian tradition. 
 
 
4. Affirming Individuals 
Jacobi contends therefore that philosophy’s implicit but necessary reliance on the 
Spinozan dictum, omnis determinatio est negatio, means that it cannot furnish a 
ground for an individual which is also intrinsic to that individual itself. This becomes 
problematic in relation to an absolute individual. Schelling’s position in the Erster 
Entwurf is consonant with this view: he attempts to account for individual natural 
products as negations (i.e. retardations or limitations) of unconditioned natural force, 
and fails. In particular, he posits the ideal of an absolute individual that would entirely 
express infinite productivity, but the limits of his explanatory paradigm – especially 
his understanding of determination as negation – prevent him from making sense of 
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such an ideal. In the second half of this essay, I want to argue that in his 
Identitätssystem Schelling responds to Jacobi’s challenge (as well as his own implicit 
acceptance of it in 1799) by rejecting the Spinozan presumption on which it is based. 
He rejects the idea that determination is a mode of negation, considering it instead a 
form of affirmation. In this way, Schelling believes he has found a way to provide an 
intrinsic ground for individuality free from all external comparison.
15
 
 Schelling’s opposition to the Jacobian tradition is most evident in his 1806 
address, Über das Verhältnis der bildenden Künste zu der Natur, where he 
definitively states, “Definiteness of form is never a negation but always an 
affirmation” (1856 7:303; 1953 334), in direct opposition to Spinoza’s claim in Letter 
50 that “figure is a negation and not anything positive”. He continues, the process of 
determination active in the genesis of individuals should be articulated as “a positive 
force, which rather runs counter to the existence of things outside one another.” (301; 
330) This is Schelling’s explicit rebuttal of the Jacobian orthodoxy on individuation in 
general and his own struggles with the problematic in the Erster Entwurf in particular. 
Individuality cannot be understood on a model of negation, and so omnis determinatio 
est negatio is a false turn for philosophy. Only on the basis of the category of 
affirmation will the concept of an individual make philosophical sense, pace Jacobi. 
According to the Identitätssystem, philosophy need not conceive individuation 
extrinsically, as a product of difference. Other alternatives are possible – and this is 
what the Identitätssystem provides. Philosophy is not fated to forever repeat Letter 50. 
 
 
5. Individuation in the Darstellung 
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The Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie of May 1801 is the first product of 
that “light” that dawned on Schelling at the time; however, from the point of view of 
his metaphysics of individuation, it is very much a transitional work.
16
 While it 
develops a critique of the attempt to describe individual beings in terms of negation, 
the text explicitly fails to provide any positive philosophical account of individual 
beings at all, and even celebrates this fact. The Darstellung revels in its acosmism. 
Only with the subsequent elaborations of the Identitätssystem during 1802 and 1803 
does a more positive account of individuation as affirmation emerge.
17
 In this section, 
I focus on two elements in the Darstellung that anticipate, in a limited fashion, this 
later account: Schelling’s logic of non-being and his first statement of the doctrine of 
quantitative differentiation. 
 
* * 
 
Schelling’s Identitätssystem opens with a commitment to monism: “Absolute identity 
is the unique thing that absolutely is or is in itself” (1856 4:119; 2001a 352), as well 
as the twin metaphilosophical assertions that “the standpoint of philosophy is the 
standpoint of reason… a knowing of things as they are in themselves” (115; 349) and 
that “outside reason is nothing, and in it is everything” (115; 350). Hence, all that is 
(identity) obeys the logic of identity and all that is not (i.e. nothingness) obeys the 
logic of non-identity, and philosophy – the construction of things as they are in 
themselves – operates according to the former logic alone. 
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 Furthermore, if everything is one, there are no distinct individuals, at least 
from a philosophical perspective (or, what is the same thing, within the domain of 
being). Schelling makes this point, first with respect to finitude,  
 
Nothing considered in itself is finite… [That is,] it follows that from the 
standpoint of reason there is no finitude, and that considering things as finite 
is precisely the same as not considering them as they are in themselves. (119; 
352) 
 
Then, explicitly with respect to individuality in §28 of the Darstellung, “There is no 
individual being or individual thing in itself.” (125; 357) To this extent, then, 
Schelling modifies Jacobian scepticism of philosophy’s capacity to account for 
individuation: philosophy fails to individuate, because there are no individuals. In so 
doing, Schelling makes explicit the problem of individuation haunting the Erster 
Entwurf, where to consider reality from the perspective of the unconditioned (i.e. 
philosophically) was to transform individuals into merely “apparent products” of 
nature, for nature “is not really concerned with the individual – it is rather occupied 
with the annihilation of the individual.” 
 Nevertheless, the above also helps distance Schelling decisively from the 
Jacobian tradition. For, while from a philosophical perspective individuation is 
impossible, the Jacobian account of individuation as negation is still deployed to 
explain the metaphysics of non-being. In other words, omnis determinatio est negatio 
becomes the non-philosophical mode of explanation par excellence. The phenomenon 
of individuality belongs now to the domain of non-being and nothingness, i.e. that 
 17 
which is non-rational and non-philosophical.
18
 And it is within this domain – and it 
alone – that the principle, omnis determinatio est negatio, holds. Here an individual is 
accounted for by not being another individual, so §35 and §36 read, “Nothing 
individual has the ground of its existence in itself… Each individual being is 
determined through another individual being… which is again determined through 
another, and so on without end.” (130-1; 360) As for Jacobi and Spinoza, individual 
non-beings form a system of difference, in which each is determined in terms of 
negation. As such, omnis determinatio est negatio is no longer the defining principle 
of philosophical accounts of individuation, nor does it have anything to do with the 
domain of being whatsoever; it is relegated to non-existence and the non-
philosophical. This leaves open the possibility of alternative accounts of the 
individuation of beings, and while such a possibility is not pursued within the 
Darstellung itself, an alternative account of determination as affirmation does indeed 
begin to emerge in the subsequent works of the Identitätssystem. 
 
* * 
 
A further shift towards a more successful account of individuation as affirmation is 
present in the Darstellung as well, and it is to be found in the doctrine of quantitative 
differentiation that Schelling first presents there. This doctrine is articulated in the text 
as a way of accounting for the genesis of individuated non-being out of the pure 
identity of being. What is central for our purposes is that Schelling turns to the 
category of quantity in order to avoid that of negation.
19
 Identity is that which admits 
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precisely this alternative recourse to quantity, for the latter is, of course, itself a revival of early modern 
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of no negation: A=A is precisely not A≠A; therefore any account in the 
Identitätssystem of how identity comes to appear as difference needs to avoid any 
recourse to negativity. 
Identity comprises all that there is, and therefore the only thing that can 
distinguish one entity from another is the degree with which such identity is posited in 
different cases. This notion of determination through degree is stressed by Schelling 
throughout the Identitätssystem in his talk of “degrees of the absolute” (1856 2:64; 
1988 48), “different grades of identity” (1856 4:431) or of individuality arising out of 
“a partial positing of infinite reality” (387). It is also what Grant means when he 
speaks of “the quantity of identity” each entity possesses for Schelling (2006 174) or 
of the fact that “there can be no differences in kind, but only in degree.” (147) On this 
basis, §23 of the Darstellung reads, “None other than quantitative difference is at all 
possible between subject and predicate.” (1856 4:123; 2001a 355) Such a thesis has 
two corollaries. First, “Any qualitative difference between the two is unthinkable”, 
because “it is the same equal absolute identity that is posited as subject and object.” 
(123; 355) That is, qualitative difference is impossible, because subject and predicate 
are the same thing: A=A is universal and no qualitative distinction holds between “A” 
and “A”.20 Second, Schelling continues,  
 
                                                                                                                                            
metaphysics, specifically its reduction of qualities to quantity. In this regard, Schelling implicitly 
positions himself in the Identitätssystem as the last of the early modern philosophers. 
20
 Schelling has earlier discussed why this is the case: “In itself,” he writes, “A has being just as much 
as B, because A, like B, is the whole of absolute identity”; that is, A and B are identical: “Nothing can 
be posited under the form A that is not as such and eo ipso also posited under the form B, and nothing 
can be posited under B that would not immediately also be posited under A.” Thus, “this opposition 
[between A and B] has utterly no standing in itself or from the viewpoint of speculation.” (135-6; 364) 
A=B is thus a form of A=A. In the 1804 System, Schelling states, “In reason, we shall never know any 
relation other than the one inherent in this identity, and the strict task of our further construction will be 
to present identity eternally as identity and to recognise nothing as real that would induce us to 
consider this identity to be cancelled or negated.” (1856 6:156; 1994a 153) 
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Since there is no possible difference between the two in terms of being itself 
(because they are equally unconditioned as subject and object, thus the same 
in essence), there remains only a quantitative difference, i.e. one that obtains 
with respect to the amount of being, such that the same identity is posited, but 
with a predominance of subjectivity or objectivity. (123; 355)  
 
What is crucial in individuating entities is the “amount of being” (or, in Grant’s 
paraphrase, “quantity of identity”). Individuals are not to be thought of as distinct 
subjects and objects but as various grades of the production of the absolute. 
Difference is quantitative. 
 One of the most fundamental implications of the above doctrine is its rejection 
of negation. “We never emerge from A=A” (1856 4:137; 2001a 365) is the guiding 
thread of the Identitätssystem.
21
 Or, in Schelling’s own words, “Absolute identity can 
never be abolished as absolute identity” (119; 352) – that is, it can never be negated. 
There is nothing which is not part of the absolute positing of the absolute: “The same 
identity is posited throughout.” (137; 365) Individuals are not generated through a 
process of negation, i.e. omnis determinatio est negatio is firmly rejected. So, 
Schelling writes in a later work, identity “cannot be negated anywhere and in no 
manner” (SW 6:179; 1994a 169), continuing elsewhere, “Reason posits neither the 
negation of opposites nor even any opposites… Negation is not posited.” (SW 7:154; 
1984b 253-4)
22
 
  
 
6. Infinite Finitude 
                                                 
21
 This statement is found in a footnote added by the editor of the Werke. It continues, “All difference 
consists just in this: A=A is posited in one direction or tendency.” 
22
 The aphorism continues, “Not the negation, therefore, for then the unity would be a merely negating 
and therefore conditioned unity.” 
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During the Identitätssystem, the absolute always and necessarily exists as formed or 
determined; for example, Schelling claims, 
 
The proposition A=A expresses a being, that of absolute identity; this being, 
however, is inseparable from its form. So there is here a unity of being and 
form, and this unity is the supreme existence. (1856 4:126; 2001a 357) 
 
Reality is always already determinate, and so nothing indeterminate exceeds it. There 
is no ineffable “behind” or “beyond” individuals. In other words, the Identitätssystem 
breaks with the synecdochical metaphysics that informed the Erster Entwurf. In the 
1799 work, unconditional productivity both is and is not its products: it exceeds them. 
In the Identitätssystem, such a worldview is rejected in the name of absolute 
immanence: the unconditioned is now nothing more than its products and entirely 
exhausted by them. Schelling’s 1799 statement that productivity “does not exhibit 
itself entirely in any finite product” is false by 1801. 
The point can be illustrated by means of a disagreement between Schelling 
and Fichte. After reading the 1801 Darstellung, Fichte countered: the absolute as 
absolute cannot be formed, for such formation would diminish its absoluteness. He 
therefore warns Schelling, “The absolute would not be absolute if it existed in any 
specific form.” (Schelling 1962 2:381; Fichte and Schelling 1997 89) Fichte argues 
that to form the absolute would be to lose something, that formation is always 
necessarily a process of alienation, but this is precisely what Schelling rejects. 
Formation is not a distortion, but in fact a production. Schelling thus writes in a later 
work, implicitly responding to Fichte’s comment, “The true [absolute] is not 
formlessness, but is delimited in itself, is finished by itself and is thus perfect.” (1856 
7:143; 1984b 246)  
 21 
Schellingian philosophy after 1801 therefore conceives form as always 
excessive or, better still, affirmative. Formation is never a diminution, loss or 
distortion; it is never a negation. What should be clear is the anti-Jacobian tenor of 
this account. At its basis stands affirmation and intensification, not negation. 
Differentiation is a result of reiterated affirmation or production. Uslar puts it as 
follows, “The inner movement of Schellingian absolute identity is fundamentally 
different from Hegel’s dialectical movement… And the fundamental difference is that 
Schelling conceives the inner movement of the absolute without negation.” (1968 
503) He continues, the basis of Schellingian thought “is not a negation of the 
negation, but the finite potentiation of an identity of identity.” (507) 
 
* * 
 
Formation thus forms part of the activity of self-affirmation in which the absolute 
consists: the absolute affirms itself and, in so doing, reality is constituted. Identity is 
affirmed and thus formed. And, in the works written after the Darstellung, Schelling 
goes on to claim that it is as part of this process of affirmative formation that 
individuation occurs. That is, individuality is no longer expelled from the domain of 
being, but is now incorporated into it, and it is Schelling’s doctrine of ideas developed 
during 1802 and 1803 that exemplifies this new position. 
 Identity affirms itself and thereby “refracts” (1856 6:441; 7:172) into 
individual expressions of identity, and this is how plurality arises in the Schellingian 
cosmos. In Tilliette’s words, “Identity unfolds into an efflorescence of forms, a 
streaming forth and profusion.” (1999 147) Reality is not merely formed as A=A, but 
also B=B or Z=Z etc, a multiplicity of expressions of identity are engendered when 
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reality constitutes itself. Schelling designates these various manifestations of identity 
“ideas”.23 Ideas designate the individuals that constitute reality; they are the absolute 
as it is variously and repeatedly formed. They are therefore what compose reality 
when it is properly viewed. During 1802 and 1803, Schelling is committed to the view 
that everything individual that exists (when reality is viewed adequately) is an idea: 
“Every particular object is in its absolute status idea.” (1856 4:405; 2001b 392) All 
ideas are absolute manifestations of identity in idiosyncratic – but parallel – forms. 
 Schelling here discovers the very conception of an absolute individual for 
which he had been searching in the Erster Entwurf. It is no longer an impossible ideal, 
but the natural outcome of his new conception of differentiation. Ideas are absolute 
individuals – “the absolute in the particular” (1856 4:405; 2001b 392)24 – and so solve 
what for the Schelling of the Erster Entwurf was “the highest problem of all 
systematic science” (1856 3:14; 2004 15): the indwelling of the infinite in the finite. 
That is, an idea constitutes a finite form in which the infinite is expressed entirely (as 
its intrinsic ground) – or, as Schelling puts it in Bruno, it is “infinite finitude” (1856 
4:248; 1984a 48). Here, “The infinite in and for itself and the finite in and for itself… 
are really only one.” (1856 4:385) This notion of the complete informing (einbilden) 
of the infinite into the finite goes on to become central to Schelling’s thinking from 
1802 onwards. In the Philosophie der Kunst, for example, he writes, “The mystery of 
all life is the synthesis of the absolute with limitation”, continuing, “The universe 
forms and moulds itself. . . [Its] consistent and pervading law is absoluteness in 
limitation.” (1856 5:393; 1989 37) This is elsewhere labelled “the essence of all art” 
                                                 
23
 See 1856 6:191; 1994a 177. 
24
 The full quotation from the Fernere Darstellungen sheds more light on this property of the ideas: 
they “furnish the unique possibility of comprehending absolute profusion within absolute unity, the 
particular in the universal, and precisely by that also the absolute in the particular – blessed beings, as 
some designate the first creatures who live in the immediate sight of God, which we shall more 
accurately say, are gods themselves, since each is for itself absolute, and yet each is included in the 
absolute form.” 
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(639; 207) or “the law of beauty” (Robinson 1976 160). To return to an earlier 
argument, this doctrine of absoluteness in limitation is a result of Schelling’s 
insistence that formation generates absoluteness, rather than diminishes it. Here we 
uncover Schelling’s mature conception of an absolute individual, or absoluteness in 
limitation: it is made possible by a reconception of individuation in terms of intense 
affirmation, rather than negation. And it is here that Schelling’s break with the 
Jacobian tradition of omnis determinatio est negatio is strongest, resulting in the 
defining thesis, “Definiteness of form is never a negation but always an affirmation.” 
 
 
8. From Process to Principle 
In the Erster Entwurf, the process of individuation poses a problem. It is a problem 
partly because Schelling still remains in thrall, implicitly at least, to a Jacobian 
conception in which the individual can only be philosophically accounted for by a 
negation – in this case, of unconditioned productivity – and thus an absolute 
individual (that which equally affirms the unconditioned and the conditioned) is 
rendered inconceivable. With the Identitätssystem, Schelling finally manages to 
liberate himself from this tradition to conceive of an affirmative form of individuality 
by means of the category of infinite finitude. 
 Two tendencies can be traced in Schelling’s transition from Naturphilosophie 
to Identitätssystem here. First, as I argued in the Introduction, the Identitätssystem 
marks a reversion to the explicit concerns and vocabularies of metaphysics, and it is 
seemingly precisely this reinsertion of the problem of individuation back into a 
metaphysical discourse that enables Schelling to more directly challenge the Jacobian 
orthodoxy and develop an alternative to it. Moreover, secondly, this is because the 
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Jacobian tradition and Schelling’s Identitätssystem oppose each other at the level of a 
principle of individuation: whereas Jacobi and Hegel assert, omnis determinatio est 
negatio, Schelling counters, omnis determinatio est affirmatio. In 1799, however, the 
formulation of a principle of individuation was in no way Schelling’s main concern; 
rather, he had been interested in “attain[ing] knowledge of the individual in process” 
(Toscano 2006 9), and so mapping “the material… operations that lead to the 
constitution of individuations without having recourse to principles of individuation” 
(3). 
 The above draws on the theoretical frame to Alberto Toscano’s The Theatre of 
Production which itself traces “the modern emergence of what we will hazard to call 
the genetic modality of individuation” (1) from Kant’s third Critique to Deleuze by 
way of Naturphilosophie.
25
 For Toscano, this represents first and foremost a “shift… 
between an ontology of individuality and an ontology of individuation” (1) – that is, 
an increasing marginalisation of any attempt to articulate one basic principle of 
individuality in favour of a description of the various material “conditions of 
realisation” of individuals (15). What occurs in Schelling’s transition from 
Naturphilosophie to Identitätssystem is, however, an exact reversal of this trend: he 
reverts to principles at the expense of his earlier interest in material conditions. 
Moreover, this is not (at least entirely) a failure or mistake on Schelling’s part: 
something significant is gained by this return to principles from processes of 
individuation. That is, it enables Schelling to re-enter into the metaphysical debates 
that informed the implicit background to his Naturphilosophie, and explicitly remould 
and reconstitute his metaphysical presuppositions. The transition to the 
Identitätssystem opens up a discursive space for Schelling to take on the Jacobian 
                                                 
25
 Toscano himself is, however, decidedly ambivalent to Schelling’s brand of Naturphilosophie (xi). 
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tradition of individuation and formulate a radical alternative. This is one reason why 
Schelling’s trajectory from January to May 1801 need not be considered a wrong 
turning. 
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